SASU / Quality engineering and offensive security

SOFIA Studio

Software testing on both sides of the specification / operated by Pipounet

SOFIA Studio is a one person practice. For more than three years I was the Lead QA of YesWeHack, a bug bounty platform: its test strategy, its API coverage and its GitLab CI pipelines were mine. I now apply the same discipline from the other side of the report. Find the state nobody wrote a test for, reproduce it end to end against the real target, then write it down so the person triaging it can reproduce it too.

HackerOne profile -> hackerone.com/pipounet
Request
GET /[redacted]/document/{id} HTTP/1.1
Expected
401 Unauthorized, no session presented
Actual
200 OK, Content-Type: application/pdf, 1.2 MB

Redacted from a reported finding. The rest of this page is what it takes to get to that one line.

Track record

Lead QA of a bug bounty platform, for over three years

Not one tester among several. The lead. I set the test strategy at YesWeHack and I wrote the automation that enforced it, so the platform's own report lifecycle was my daily object long before it became my hunting ground: submission, triage, duplicate handling, scope definition, severity scoring.

Role
Lead QA, and the automation engineer on the same seat. Strategy and implementation were not split between two people.
Tenure
More than three years on the product.
API
Full working command of the platform API: contract checks, regression suites, and the fixtures that kept them honest across releases.
Pipelines
GitLab CI, with test stages that gated what shipped instead of reporting on it afterwards.
Coverage
Web application, API and release validation, from test design through to the automated suite that ran without me.

Knowing what triage sees is why the reports in this practice arrive reproducible on the first read.

Two tracks, one discipline

Quality engineering on spec

Test design against requirements: boundaries, negative cases, state transitions, regression passes and release gates. The output is a defect a developer can reproduce on the first read, not a screenshot with a question mark next to it.

Playwright, Maestro, GitLab CI, Burp Suite, HTTP contract checks

Offensive research off spec

The same instinct with no requirement document to bound it. What happens on the path the designer assumed nobody would take: another tenant's identifier, an origin the allowlist did not mean to include, a token that was never meant to leave the build.

Frida, mitmproxy, ffuf, Wireshark, custom Python and Rust

The studio

One practitioner, no layer in between

Bug bounty and VDP
Continuous testing on public and private programs, under the program's own rules of engagement. Paid on result, which keeps the incentive honest.
Application review
Web and API work against a scope you define: access control, tenancy boundaries, identity flows, the browser origin model.
Mobile build review
Android and iOS packages taken apart: secrets shipped in the build, exported surface, deeplinks, pinning, then the live traffic behind them.
Quality engineering
Test design, automation and CI coverage for teams that ship faster than their test suite grows.

The person who talks to you is the person who runs the tests and writes the report. Nothing is subcontracted.

Capability

What the studio takes on

Web and API
Access control and tenancy boundaries, session handling, credentialed CORS, the browser origin model (postMessage, storage, deeplinks), injection into directories, templates and query languages.
Mobile
Android and iOS builds: decompilation, hardcoded credentials and endpoints, exported components and deeplink surface, pinning bypass through runtime instrumentation, full traffic interception on a device I own.
Identity
OAuth2 and OIDC redirect handling, SAML, LDAP directories, passwordless and reset flows, session fixation, trust leaking between preproduction and production identity providers.
Network and protocol
WebSocket, SMTP, SOAP, SSH, SNMP, printing protocols, ISO 8583 payment messaging. Scoped address range sweeps at the rate the program publishes, from one declared source address.
Cloud and exposure
Server side request forgery into instance metadata, object storage and signed URL handling, source map and build artefact leaks, certificate transparency and DNS driven surface mapping.
Write up
CVSS scored reports with a working proof of concept, a clean reproduction path and an impact statement a program owner can act on without a second round of questions.

Selected work

Findings, by class and by surface

No client, program or vendor is named on this page. Each entry gives the vulnerability class, the kind of surface it lived on, and what was actually proven.

CriticalVideo meetings platform / web

Cross origin storage write into a third party token

A storage broker page accepted the literal string null inside its origin allowlist. A sandboxed frame on an attacker page therefore passed the origin check and wrote arbitrary keys into the application's own storage. The injected cloud storage token survived a browser restart, hydrated into application state on the next visit, and became the credential used for the victim's next cloud recording upload.

Chain run end to end, including the storage write surviving a full browser restart.

HighFinancial market infrastructure / identity provider

Pre authentication directory injection on a login endpoint

The identity provider passed the login field into an LDAP filter without escaping it. A wildcard turned a single account lookup into a directory search, and the response surfaced account identifiers belonging to unrelated customers.

Reached before any credential was supplied, from an unauthenticated request.

HighBanking web terminal / distributed build

Static token shipped inside an application build

A credential extracted from a distributed build authenticated calls to a customer facing REST service. With no user session at all, the endpoint returned customer records.

Found by reading the build, confirmed against the live service with that token as the only input.

MediumCollaboration server / self hosted

Privilege escalation by role injection

Role validation rejected one literal administrator string and nothing else. A channel administrator could write a delegated system role into their own channel membership, and the permission resolver then granted every capability attached to that role, including actions reserved for a higher tier.

Accepted and rewarded. Re-confirmed still live in a later release.

MediumEquipment rental / B2B portal

Cross tenant object access on an administrative API

Object identifiers were checked for existence but not for ownership, so one tenant's session read another tenant's records.

Reproduced across two accounts under my own control.

Method

Rules the studio holds itself to

  • Nothing is reported until the chain runs against the real target. A request that only works against a listener on my own machine is a hypothesis, not a finding.
  • "An attacker could" is not an impact statement. The report says what I did, with the request and the response that prove it happened.
  • The rules of engagement are the test plan. Declared source address, the identifying header the program asks for, the published rate limit, and the scope exactly as written.
  • I retract my own false positives. When a re-test kills a finding it comes back before triage has to spend time on it, the same reflex as closing a defect I raised in error.
  • No customer data leaves the test. Proof of access is an identifier and a status code, never a dump.

Lab

Tools and training ground

wsx
A WebSocket auditing toolkit written in Rust, developed against a local Docker range of deliberately broken endpoints.Handshake and origin handling, message level fuzzing, session state abuse
wsx-ctf
A 23 challenge lab of my own: 20 WebSocket scenarios and 3 SMTP ones, each modelled on a real disclosed report rather than on a puzzle.Docker, three difficulty tiers per class
Hack The Box
Machines taken to root and written up in full: a Samba configuration injection chain, a printing protocol path traversal into an SSH foothold, and a metadata service pivot reached through a decimal encoded address.Abducted (root), Paperwork (root), Nimbus (user)
Programs engaged
Around thirty programs across financial market infrastructure, private banking, telecom, automotive, connected locks, city government, education, cinema, port logistics, HR platforms and managed cloud databases.HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti

Profile

HackerOne

Member since
May 2020
Reputation
39
Signal
3.00
Badges
3
  • Bounty Hunter
  • Program milestone L1
  • Program milestone L2

Figures read from the public profile on 11 September 2026. Private program work does not appear there, and that is most of it.