Findings, by class and by surface
No client, program or vendor is named on this page. Each entry gives the vulnerability class, the kind of surface it lived on, and what was actually proven.
CriticalVideo meetings platform / web
Cross origin storage write into a third party token
A storage broker page accepted the literal string null inside its origin allowlist. A sandboxed frame on an attacker page therefore passed the origin check and wrote arbitrary keys into the application's own storage. The injected cloud storage token survived a browser restart, hydrated into application state on the next visit, and became the credential used for the victim's next cloud recording upload.
Chain run end to end, including the storage write surviving a full browser restart.
HighFinancial market infrastructure / identity provider
Pre authentication directory injection on a login endpoint
The identity provider passed the login field into an LDAP filter without escaping it. A wildcard turned a single account lookup into a directory search, and the response surfaced account identifiers belonging to unrelated customers.
Reached before any credential was supplied, from an unauthenticated request.
HighBanking web terminal / distributed build
Static token shipped inside an application build
A credential extracted from a distributed build authenticated calls to a customer facing REST service. With no user session at all, the endpoint returned customer records.
Found by reading the build, confirmed against the live service with that token as the only input.
MediumCollaboration server / self hosted
Privilege escalation by role injection
Role validation rejected one literal administrator string and nothing else. A channel administrator could write a delegated system role into their own channel membership, and the permission resolver then granted every capability attached to that role, including actions reserved for a higher tier.
Accepted and rewarded. Re-confirmed still live in a later release.
MediumEquipment rental / B2B portal
Cross tenant object access on an administrative API
Object identifiers were checked for existence but not for ownership, so one tenant's session read another tenant's records.
Reproduced across two accounts under my own control.